with a few genetic variants, some in the new civic space of the science blogosphere argued the US government did with all genomic information: it locked it up, keeping it from the persons to whom it rightfully belonged (Angrist 2010) . 1 In these and other cases, critics charged dominant institutions-big pharma, big gene testing companies, the Federal Drug Administration, the National Institutes of Health, and large medical schools-with unjustly taking power. Ethics, particularly institutionalized bioethics, failed to prevent this (Angrist 2009; Lunshof et al. 2008) . A revolution was needed, one that would go back to the first principles of democratic governance. Genomics by and for the people must overthrow big government genomics. Justice, not ethics, should frame the discussion.
Genomics is but one of many forms of contemporary technoscience in which such claims to justice today figure as a potent force. From global health to sustainable agriculture to green energy, increasingly both scholars of science and technology and practicing scientists and engineers cite justice as an organizing theme of their work (Farmer 2005; Schneider, Lucena, and Leydens, 2009; Kabo and Baille 2009 ; National Academy of Engineering 2010). 2 At my own institution, in 2006 I helped to found the Science and Justice Working Group. 3 What has been striking is the power of justice when joined to science to gather people from across all divisions of our University to work together on common problems.
In what follows, I explore this contemporary conjugation of ''science and justice.'' I draw my use of the word ''conjugation'' from Donna Haraway's recent writings on multispecies response-ability (Haraway 2012) . In this writing, Haraway calls for curiosity about who and what technoscience conjugates-that is, about who and what join together ''transversally and across time and space to make significant things happen'' (Haraway 2012, 307) . Following these conjugations, she argues, matters. It brings us into the worlds that are made and unmade through these technoscientific joins, and helps us develop the knowledges and critical ''muscle [s] '' needed to respond and care for them (Haraway 2012, 312) . It calls our attention to how worlds might change as powerful nouns such as science and justice come together and transform what each term can signify and create in the current conjuncture. In this essay, I follow the worlds made and unmade by the yoking together of science and justice, and how in turn science and justice get made and unmade in the process. I describe and consider the histories and meanings carried forth, as well as those that fail to proliferate. I consider the opportunities, but also the dangers, gained and lost.
To cultivate this critical attention, I tell a story about science and justice that draws upon my three-year ethnographic study of the rise of personal genomics. Personal genomics is a particularly good place to begin explorations of the rise of ''science and justice'' for in many ways it was the very shift from ethics to justice that provided the opening for this new field. Thus, it reveals what justice conjugated with science does: what is opened up for and whom; what is foreclosed and how. I conclude with reflections on other forms ''science and justice'' might take, and what might be gained or lost in fostering them. In particular, I draw attention to the universalizing tendencies of justice that dominate its contemporary conjugations with science, and explore the possibility and need for a science and justice that is able to denaturalize and speculate about other possible worlds.
The Rise of Science and Justice
Given justice's strong historical ties to divine law, it is surprising that the term gathers so many when conjoined with science. Many scientists and engineers express deep discomfort with dogmatic religious authority, and science studies scholars question dogmatic authority of all kinds. 4 In light of this, it is necessary to explain why many practicing scientists and engineers, as well as scholars of science and technology, have found this ''hitching together'' compelling (Bowker 2011) .
Of course, like all accounts, this one must be situated-situated, in particular, in the last four decades of efforts to come to terms with the increasingly obvious point that lives and technics are not separate; that how we know is how we live; that we urgently need ways to account for and respond to these contemporary conjugations. In the early years of these efforts, the figure of ethics did a lot of work. Responding to egregious abuses of human subjects and growing awareness of the environmental and societal costs of science and engineering, in the 1970s and 1980s policies, programs, and journals of bioethics and of science and engineering ethics sprung up in the United States (Carson 1962; Belmont Report 1979; Rothman 1992) . These developments brought much needed institutional attention to the intersection of science, engineering, and the conduct of contemporary lives.
While primarily an American phenomenon, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, institutionalized forms of science and engineering ethics began to emerge all over the world due in no small part to the pressure of participating in a global economic order increasingly shaped and mediated by technoscience (Bai, Shirai, and Ishii 1987; Gbadegesin 1993; Garcia 1996) . The central role that the life sciences played in shaping these economies and cultures of the late twentieth century came in no small part through extensive Reardon 3 efforts to secure the field's ethical value (Kelly 2006, 72) . 5 Genome scientists in particular recognized that genomics would not succeed if perceived to not only lack ethical value but to undermine it through creating new forms of discrimination (Reardon 2005) . Thus, the 1993 law that established the US National Human Genome Research Center mandated 5 percent of the funds support an Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) Research Program (Cook-Deegan 1994, 343) . During the same year, in the wake of extensive critiques from indigenous rights leaders, organizers of the Human Genome Diversity Project appointed an ethics director (Reardon 2005, 114) . It is this instrumental nature of the spread of ethics-its role in legitimating technoscience and rendering it palatablethat by the late 1990s began to worry and weary many, including some science studies scholars who began to call for the analysis of institutionalized forms of ethics (Strathern 2000; Jasanoff 2005; Reardon 2005; Sunder Rajan 2006) . Some of us took those efforts forward, and attempted to reimagine and reform institutional approaches to science, engineering, and ethics (Kelly 2006 ). Yet for many, by the dawn of the new millennium, it had become clear that the dominant routes and habits of institutionalized ethics had been set: they oriented around conforming to regulatory law, not the evolving needs and concerns of the ever growing number of living beings who gave of their time and bodies for research. 6 Today, the result is that for far too many research subjects-human and nonhuman alike-ethics hinges on the proper filling out of forms. For far too many scientists and engineers (and increasingly social scientists and humanities scholars), it manifests as a mandatory course or online web training. It is an e-mail sent from bureaucratic headquarters (e.g., a University research administration office) requesting an hour or two in front of a computer answering questions about how one should comport oneself. The production values are low, and the experience often soul draining. Many view the task as merely an administrative hoop to jump through.
On the other hand, over this same time period justice has emerged as something rather different. Far from punitive and bureaucratic, justice inspires. This is so partly because contemporary calls for justice-such as those that accompany the rise of the global health and Occupy movements-invite us to move outside of the space of thinking about the self, and the conduct of the self, in this age of the self (Rose 1996) . 7 In a moment when institutions-even public ones-encourage us to focus inwardly, these increasingly prominent calls for justice offer a space for thinking about others. They orient us around the collective-around what can come together and what cannot and why.
Contemporary calls for justice also can inspire because they offer the chance to transcend existing troubled and constricting forms of government in order to reach somewhere else. While ethics increasingly has become a dominant institutional form-that which is associated with bureaucracy, audit cultures, and legal accountability-justice promises a new beginning, an opportunity to denaturalize and transcend closed and constricting forms of bureaucracy to reach an opening: a space of freedom. Historically, a religious figure promised this transcendence: God. More recently, a secular figure provides the opening: humanity. Specifically, the figure of humanity provides those without a State, or those who feel disempowered by one, another ground on which to make claims and seek rights. This articulation of justice to human rights has increased salience in a world where many endeavor to build binding relations among humans and nonhumans in spaces beyond the nation-state. This is the world of the cosmopolitan (Appiah 2006) . One world. One people. Global justice.
It is here that we begin to feel justice's lofty power. John Rawls captured this aspect of justice in the opening pages of his enormously influential book, A Theory of Justice: ''Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought . . . . Being first virtues of human activities, truth and justice are uncompromising'' (Rawls 1971 (Rawls [1999 . In other words, justice trumps all else. It is the starting point of social life-that which one cannot be against.
This, historically, has been the danger of justice. It is its very power to elevate, to gather people together, that makes it generative. Yet, the new lease on life it offers comes with inextricable dangers. As bedrock, justice can lack mobility, play, and the sense that things could be otherwise. As the first virtue of social life, it easily resists critique. And yet, à la Foucault, I do not believe dangers can be avoided, no matter our approach (Foucault 1977, 163) . Perhaps more to the point, as Donna Haraway has taught us, if we are to understand and enable responses to our world, we must ''stay with the trouble'' (Haraway 2010) . More thoughtful-and indeed, just-practices arise from tempering justice's elevating powers with attentiveness to its troubling heights.
Genomics: From Ethics to Justice
Genomics is a particularly interesting place in which to cultivate this attention. Over the course of the last decade, the relations I have just described between ethics and justice have not just influenced genomics, they have formed its core ideas and practices. This is because over this time period, Reardon 5 justice emerged as that which ''ethics'' never proved able to be: the moral force that would finally cut genomics' ties with human genetics, particularly those aspects of twentieth-century human genetics associated with Nazi science, eugenics, and racism. Indeed, for all the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on ELSI and bioethics research and programming-especially in the United States and the United Kingdom-the twenty-first century began with many of the same concerns that marked the twentieth century. Race reemerged as a concept that geneticists increasingly used and defended (Duster 2001; Risch et al. 2002; Burchard et al. 2003) . Researchers continued to collect and use the DNA of Native and indigenous peoples in ways that threatened to stigmatize and undermine their rights (Tallbear 2003; Dalton 2004 ).
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Beginning in 2007, however, we began to witness something that appeared rather different. Led largely by scientists, but also spurred by some legal cases, a wellspring of challenges to dominant institutionalized approaches to the science and ethics of studying human genomes began to appear. These challenges understood the problem of human genomics not as one of powerful scientists exploiting vulnerable subjects, but one of powerful institutions exploiting people. Consider the cases that began this essay: Myriad Genetics' commercialization of critical medical information about breast cancer genetic variants; the US government lockdown of genomic information about its citizens. A growing number of vocal young scientists and a few elder statesman pronounced these moves unjust, and science blogs and popular science books amplified their views (Sulston and Ferry, 2002; Angrist 2010). 9 They called for a return of power to the people and the public domain. Justice and science, and not the bioethics of powerful institutions, should guide.
These principles played a formative role in the founding of the personal genomics company, 23andMe. Committed to the principle that genomic information should be of, for, and by people, Linda Avey and Anne Wojcicki opened the cyberdoors of 23andMe in the fall of 2007, allowing the public to enter a domain that previously had been tightly regulated, and off limits to most nonscientists. Below I consider the powerful contemporary and historical currents that converged to make this possible. My goal is to set aside grand rhetoric and examine the specific meanings and practices that were joined together to make this move possible. In so doing, I ask: What is opened up and what is foreclosed by this exemplar of the contemporary conjunction of science and justice? Overthrowing the Genetic Overlords: 23andMe Offers Power to the People?
In the fall of 2007, with the support of Google cofounder and billionaire Sergey Brin, 23andMe would be one of the first two personal genomics companies to open. Brin and 23andMe cofounder Linda Avey met through Brins' interest in Parkinson's disease. Avey sought faster progress in genomics, a field she felt suffered from feudal governance structures that blocked more fluid interactions between people and researchers. In an interview in Wired magazine, Brin described hoped for faster breakthroughs that might lead to treatments for Parkinson's disease, a disease that his mother had developed and that associated with the LRRK2 genetic variant contained within his own genome (Goetz 2010) . Powered by Google's money and algorithms, Avey and Brin's wife, Anne Wojcicki, created a company that sought to achieve these goals through turning human genetics on its head. Why assume that genetics is dangerous and harmful and that people should be protected from it? This, Avey argued, led to a dreadful state of affairs-one she described as ''feudal''-in which geneticist overlords ''protected'' their research subjects by not giving them access to their genetic information. 10 Why not presume instead, as Google did, that information is good; that information tailored to individual needs and wants is even better; that sharing this personal information is better still? 23andMe set out to establish the informatic infrastructure that would make this, what they believed would be the people's genomic revolution, possible.
Specifically, it created spit kits. Anyone could purchase these kits and send in their DNA-rich saliva for genotyping. Customers could then browse their results and learn about their genetic selves on 23andMe's colorful and playful Web site. They could also, if they so chose, participate in 23andMe's research by sharing their results with the 23andWe research community. 11 In this way, 23andMe sought to harness the power of social networking platforms to the force of a consumer's rights framework to create a new model of both scientific research and democratic governance. The abstract dehumanized ''subject'' of human genetics, they argued, would become the empowered ''person'' of genomics 2.0.
12 Access to one's own personal genomic information would become the basis for participating in a new collectivity, the 23andWe research community-a collectivity dependent not on professional experts, but rather enabled by the power of 23andMe customers to share their personal genetic data: 23andMe isn't just about you. Our research arm, 23andWe, gives customers the opportunity to leverage their data by contributing it to studies of genetics. With enough data, we believe 23andWe can produce revolutionary findings that will benefit us all.
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In short, by going back to the first principle of democratic governancethat people should have the power-23andMe promised to rebuild genomics from the ground up. It appealed to a growing sense that dominant models of biomedical and genomic research were not only broken-recruitment of subjects was painstakingly slow, and discoveries even slower-but they also were unjust. It was time to return to a reevaluation of first principles and to enact fundamental institutional changes aimed at meeting the needs of people, and not the interests of big government or big pharma. 14 The result: a ''Research Revolution'' modeled on the American Revolution.
Cofounder Linda Avey made this spirit of democratic revolution explicit in her inaugural post to her personal blogsite, The Life and Times of Lilly Mendel, Avey asserts:
I still strongly believe in the main reason why my co-founder, Anne Wojcicki, and I started 23andMe in the first place-to take genetics out of the protective realm of the scientific community and make it accessible to the lay public . . . . [V]ery vocal scientists seem to be quite threatened by this notion of democratizing DNA [italics added].
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While Anne Wojcicki's matrimonial ties to Brin provoked many to wonder how democratic or scientific a company could be if it was backed by one of the world's largest companies, a company that held immense amounts of personal data about people, 23andMe would not be deterred. 16 It would ditch human genetics' historic feudalism-entrenched in both its institutionalized scientific and ethical practices-in favor of the people's rights to access their genomic information.
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Overthrowing the Genetic Overlords: Power to Genomics?
How do we understand this remarkable turn of events? As I need not remind most readers, the long history of efforts to study human biological variation is marked by accusations of racism and abuse of human subjects (Stepan 1982; Duster 1990 ). How then was 23andMe able to reposition the study of human genetic variation so that it was aligned with, and not opposed to, the rights of people? What makes 23andMe's appeal to open up the field of genomics, to free it from unjust overlords, possible? For answers to these questions, we require a less glamorous and more grounded account of 23andMe. In particular, we need to understand the broader field out of which its claims to liberate persons and their genomes arose.
While 23andMe now is perhaps the only company calling for unfettered access to genomic data, it by no means stands alone. 18 The story is complex, but at its core is the importance of open access and the problem of enclosures for the whole field of genomics (not just 23andMe). Open access to data is essential for genomics, and for the very same reason that informatics-from which the values and practices of open access came-is essential: unlike human genetics, genomics requires too many bits of data for any one person to understand and control. While it was possible for a single lab to go out fishing for genes, putting together a genome with 3 billion data points required a huge net-an Internet. Many of the genome scientists that I have interviewed and work with celebrate the new mode of work that emerged from these efforts. Instead of feudal enclaves, genome scientists work out in the open, in the ''public domain'' supported by large public sources of funding (Sulston and Ferry 2002, 146) . 20 While I believe there is much to celebrate in the emergence of this commitment to public science-to open, not enclose, research-it is important to remember that this ethos gained support because it in many ways formed the nonnegotiable conditions of genomics. Thus, a less glamorous account of 23andMe would understand the company as extending an open access ethos in a manner required by the completion of the Human Genome Project. Today, it is not enough to sequence the genomes of a few people from Buffalo, New York-whose sequence make up the public Human Genome Project's ''human genome. '' 21 To make sense of ''the human genome,'' we need access to many, many more genomes. Further, for some types of research, most notably cancer genome research, we need Reardon 9 not one-time access to the genome of multiple individuals, we need ongoing access over a person's life course to the genomes of their individual cells (e.g., their tumor cells). For this, or so the argument goes, it will not do to keep genomes on lock down, separated from their humans. We need to forge links between human beings and their molecular parts. We need individuals who want to cultivate these links, to interact with their genomes and the information feedback loops these interactions will help to create (O'Riordan 2010). These epistemological needs condition 23andMe's calls to democratize genomics. Rather than a lone wolf, the company is supported by a wide field of genomic researchers who increasingly argue against the dense ethical practices that emerged during the human genetics age. These practices, they warn, threaten to bring genomics to a halt. 22 Those who would oppose them-medical geneticists, government regulators, and some of the ''vulnerable populations'' they seek to protect-are either representatives of entrenched institutions that no longer represent people and their biologies or anachronistic human beings stuck in the past and at risk of being left behind (Angrist 2010) . Witness the declining number of people applying to medical genetics programs and the plummeting of trust and support for state governments.
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These are strong contemporary currents. And they are strong in no small measure because they have been able to configure themselves as just. They tap into current anti-institution sentiments, making appeals that transcend institutions in order to make claims based on a higher power-one that represents all humans. Like the genome?
Genomes and Humanity: Constituting the Grounds for Inclusion and Exclusion
In this moment, the genome is indeed a potent figure, and one that works well with the figure of justice. Justice, as Milton Fisk explains in his introduction to Justice: Key Concepts in Critical Theory, is that which does not take sides, and thus tends toward the universal (Fisk 1993, 1-2) . It is about and for us all. Genomics, as we know, also tends toward the universal. This idea was written into the very name, The Human Genome Project. Thus, rather than an achievement, a sign of breaking through institutionalized ethics to something more meaningful and more just, we might have arrived at a point that was rather more predictable. In a moment where the global and the universals that facilitate it are on the rise, genomics and justice appear a likely pair. Indeed, articulating genomes to justice feels almost already written into the script of this contemporary modern drama in which informatic infrastructures such as Facebook, Google and now, many hope, genomics mediate all that is still growing and imbued with the potential for life in a time of worldwide recession and decline. It is the very predictability and power of this script, I suggest, that should give us pause. While it is compelling, where is it leading us? Is this somewhere we all really want to go?
The answer might be yes. Ten years ago, I attended a meeting at the National Human Genome Research Institute to celebrate the first ten years of their ELSI Program. 24 There I met someone who was active in the Chicano movement in the seventies and who was leading focus groups on genetics in one of the poorest cities in the United States. These focus groups had been developed in response to a first round of community consultations funded by the National Human Genome Research Institute that had been done in primarily white upper-class communities. In other words, the project sought to diversify the original round of consultations (Bonham et al. 2009 ). Frustrated with this ''how can we add diversity to the Human Genome Project'' approach, and knowing this person's political history and commitments, I asked why he had chosen to support and help conduct the project. Why not instead refuse genomics altogether, and demand that resources go to projects with more direct relevance to his communities? After all, this strategy might very well be successful. If nonwhites en masse refused to participate, human genomics might not move forward. It simply would be too white; this homogeneity would compromise its claim to universality. If nothing else, a discussion would be forced that might help both genomics and nonwhite communities to understand the value and place of this new field of technoscience. As we road up one of the forever-long Washington DC subway escalators, he responded, ''Well, it's like the Ashcroft hearings.'' The John Ashcroft confirmation hearings were in their second day, and despite Ashcroft's homophobia and racism, he would be confirmed as the next Attorney General of the United States.
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In this way of looking at things, the stage has been set. Genomics has already become a powerful figure of the universal, poised to make strong claims on justice. Facebook is already downloaded on the computers, iPods, iPads, and cell phones of my friends and family. The only choice left to me is whether to join. To join is to become a part of the world. Today that means digital connection, and the ability to imagine, and maybe access, new medical treatments. Perhaps most importantly, it means being a part of the mediums in which contemporary life in the West-and increasingly elsewhere-is made and unmade. To not join is to take a stand, but to be awfully lonely, even abject (Kristeva 1982; Shteyngart 2010) . 26 Reardon 11 From within this frame-one in which genomics is nonnegotiable, that which we must accept as a powerful contemporary figure of the universal-it makes sense to fight for justice in a classic American style: fight for inclusion. The strategy is not to question the status of genomics as a figure of a universal good, but to fight to make genomics a good of truly universal value. For example, one might focus on the sampling bias in genomics. As 23andMe states on its Web site:
Unfortunately, because of where and how biomedical research is funded, there are comparatively few studies looking for genetic associations in populations that form a minority in the countries where much of the latest research takes place. In other words, most of the associations reported in the Gene Journal have only been confirmed in populations of European ancestry. For example, only one SNP has been confirmed as associated with risk of type 2 diabetes in African samples.
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In 2009, Anna Need and David Goldstein brought this problem to the readers of Trends in Genetics with an article entitled, ''Next generation disparities in human genomics: concerns and remedies'' (Need and Goldstein 2009) . If more ''populations of diverse ancestry'' were not included in genomic research, they argued, the ''genetics community'' might inadvertently contribute to health care disparities. Malia Fullerton and her coauthors recently provided the most thoughtful account of this problem that I have read to date (Fullerton 2011 ).
Yet as compelling and important as these arguments are, there is also a significant danger in pushing for inclusion. Although perhaps not a necessary or even intended component of the argument, this construction of genomics and justice can imply that we all agree that genomics is a universal good, and thus we should all have access to it. The project of justice then is a matter of better practices of inclusion. This position, I argue, cedes too much.
Exactly what gets ceded is something that many Native peoples asked to take part in genetic research in their communities have spent decades articulately explaining, although with little effect. As they have eloquently asked, when many of their people do not have adequate food and shelter, how could investing more money in genomic research on Native peoples possibly be viewed as the right thing to do? As one attendee at a meeting held at Stanford University to discuss the ethics of the Human Genome Diversity Project explained to me, now over ten years ago: Just in December, elders froze in South Dakota because of substandard housing. And then you look at the millions and millions of dollars that are being spent to research indigenous peoples' DNA with absolutely no regard for our lives, and maybe even no intent to ensure our survival as peoples. I honestly don't think that there is much of an interest really to make sure that we survive as who we are. (Interview with Author, April 16, 1999) Native peoples as well as members of communities for whom access to basic health care is a struggle continue to point out this basic problem (Beeson and Duster 2002) . While most researchers will respond (and have on numerous occasions told me) that this is an issue that they have no power to do anything about, this does not mean that we should not try to understand why this is, and what institutional changes could be made so that a different response-indeed, any adequate response-might become possible. If we instead cede responsibility for this critical problem, questions about how we come to define and recognize lives worth supporting with our limited resources fall out of view. By assuming that genomics for all is the goal, these critical questions remain unaddressed, and the needs, let alone desires, of too many living beings become unrecognizable.
Toward a Situated, Speculative Justice
In order to create a world that is able to respond to these lives the very constitution of both technoscience and justice must enter our stories. Specifically, in the case of genomics, we must recognize that despite its claim to represent ''the human,'' genomics is not a universal human science. Instead, as we have just seen in the case of 23andMe, dominant forms of genomics are put together from very particular conceptions of biology, humanity, and justice that bring resources and attention to some lives while occluding others. As Native legal scholar Rebecca Tsosie has explained, this dominant form of genomics is built from concepts of ownership, property, and privacy that presume a particular set of cultural values that make it very hard, if not impossible, to recognize the values and lives of many (Tsosie 2007) .
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To illustrate, let us return for a moment to genomics' ethos of public science. As described earlier in this article, genome scientists celebrate their openness, and their commitment to public science. Not only is this an ethos, it is a condition of genomic work, and thus shapes the construction of genomic tools (e.g., genome databases and browsers). While good for a particular way of constituting genomics, and good for a Reardon 13 particular notion of the ''public good'' (one that equates sharing of data with increased knowledge, and knowledge as a good for all), it has made it very difficult for Native peoples to participate in genomic research. Many Native people might willingly participate in this research if they thought it might advance understandings of medical problems of importance to them, such as diabetes (Garrison, this issue). However, the fear that their samples might end up in an open access repository that would render their DNA available for use in any research project-including studies of human migrations that in the past have threatened Native sovereignty rights-creates a significant disincentive (Tsosie, 2007; Tallbear 2007; Garrison, this volume) . For Native people, the goods of genomics are not universal. They depend on the specific articulation of genomics to specific values and practices-most notably, practices that would allow some control of one's samples so that they might be used in research that supports their lives and values (e.g., the power to specify that one's DNA can be used for diabetes and not human migrations research). For many genome scientists, this is an ethical and technical impossibility. Some even have told me that this would bring genomics research to a halt; open access is simply a condition of contemporary bioinformatic, and thus, genomic research. This understanding and enactment of genomics assumes that some version of open access is the bedrock on which genomics must be built. 29 There is no imagining that things could be otherwise. There is no recognition that genomic forms of open access have their consequences. It does not serve all. Rather, it facilitates some ways of knowing and being in the world, while curtailing others. 30 A too easy embrace of a justice frame, with its tendency to frame things in terms of universals, hides these exclusions.
To bring these exclusions back into our view, and to build a justice that is more responsive, Tsosie has introduced the notion of intercultural justice. This form of justice calls on us to ask after the values embedded in institutions of science and the law, and seeks to build institutions that can respond to differences in values, and to lives that fall outside of dominant legibilities (Tsosie 2007, 408 ).
Tsosie's argument resonates with the argument Amartya Sen makes in his work on poverty. Sen argues that to address the problem of poverty, and to create a more just and equitable world, we must not just deploy concepts (such as ''poverty'' and ''income''), we must ask after their very formation, and understand what assumptions and values they build into our ways of knowing and changing the world. As he writes:
The practical world is a constant source of conceptual challenges, and it is right that we should try to reassess our concepts and ideas in the light of the manifest problems that empirical work identifies. (Sen 2006, 30) Prisicilla Wald takes up this call in her current work on notions of the human being that are at play in post-World War II (WWII) scientific and technological innovation and social and political thought (Wald 2012) . As she suggests, in our laudable efforts to secure the rights of human beings in the post-WWII era, we have paid too little attention to the fundamental concepts on which those efforts rest: the human, the individual, race, and rights. The consequence is that we miss the exclusions and discriminatory practices that are built into these concepts and that set the stage upon which any human rights initiative can proceed. Consider, as Wald does, the case of Henrietta Lacks.
In the last few years, due to the meteoric success of Rebecca Skloot's book, The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks, many now understand Henrietta Lacks to be an African American woman whose rights were violated by having her cells immortalized without her knowledge, let alone consent (Skloot 2010 ). Skloot's story now joins those told about the Tuskegee syphilis experiment as a prime exemplar of biomedicine's violation of the human rights of African Americans (Reverby 2009 For decades, no one associated a person with the HeLa cells. Researchers simply treated these cells like any other standard research tool, giving little or no thought to their origins. That story changed in the 1960s when it became widely known that the cells were contaminating other human cell lines, ruining countless research experiments around the world. It is only then-at a point of crisis-that the cells became associated with a ''Negro'' (Skloot 2010, 153) . In particular, as Wald argues, researchers' description of the cells as ''virulent,'' ''invasive,'' and ''the enemy,'' figured the cells as ''a bestialized, invasive, contaminating, sexually promiscuous African American woman'' (Wald 2012, 251) . In the Skloot account, these racist assumptions about African American women that facilitate linking the Reardon 15 HeLa cell lines back to Henrietta Lacks receive no mention. As a result, Wald argues, Skloot fails to recognize important elements of institutional racism that make her New York Times best-selling story possible. Ironically, in our too easy embrace of a story about race, science, and social justice, these connections are not made, and thus important routes to justice forestalled. These routes begin to reopen when we return to fundamental concepts and imagine that things might be otherwise. As Wald reminds us, the Martinique psychiatrist and political theorist Frantz Fanon called for these reimaginings in his highly influential text on decolonization, The Wretched of the Earth. Wald (2012, 254) writes, ''[Fanon] urges citizens of the newly decolonized and decolonizing nations not to emulate Europe, not to imagine that they have to 'catch up' to anyone, but rather to understand that a new humanity will follow from the new stories of humankind.''
Concluding Thoughts
Sixty years ago, Hannah Arendt astutely noted that despite talk of universal human rights, such rights depended upon one's recognition by a state. These states were not run by general principles (e.g., human rights for all), but rather ''ever changing circumstances'' that were kept out of view through ''carefully organized ignorance'' (Arendt 1948 (Arendt [1979 , 244). As science takes on more and more state-like functions-formulating and responding to the needs of human and nonhuman species-the contemporary constitution and care for life increasingly depends on recognition by technoscience. 31 If this is the case, then the orientation of science-the lives it supports and values-becomes an issue of fundamental importance. Carefully organized ignorance of this orientation becomes a real danger, and one that is facilitated by any easy conjugation of science and justice.
Given these conditions, if we are to embrace science and justice, then I urge us toward a critical embrace, one that moderates the feverish pitch of both science and justice with sober interrogations of their underlying assumptions. We require a thick commitment to justice, one that entails questioning fundamental concepts and one that steers clear of righteousness. We need a justice that elevates us at the same time that it keeps us grounded, attentive to the specific ''cuts'' that our enactments of it make: the lives that are made and lost (Barad 2007 ). This justice, as Maria Puig de la Bellacasa teaches us, comes not only from victories-from what is gained. It comes also from recognizing the other possible worlds never pursued, as well as those that might still be enacted (Puig de la Bellacasa 2011).
''[I]t might have been otherwise,'' Leigh Star wisely reminded us (Star 1991, 53) . We must stay with both the trouble and the power of that possibility.
To achieve this, justice must move from a topic of reflection and writing in philosophy, law, and science studies to an orienting goal of institutional change. Rather than adding a bioethics course to the training of science and engineering, we must build spaces in which social scientists, engineers, natural scientist, and humanists can come together to understand, reflect on, and respond to the particular ways in which science and engineering projects connect to specific ways of making and enacting the world. This kind of common work creates the conditions for imagining other routes to knowledge and justice. It enables formulations of justice that derive not from codified reactions but from responses to the specific conditions and consequences of knowledge production.
32 Within universities, these spaces must not be seen as ''interdisciplinary'' add-ons but as fundamental to what it means to discipline ourselves in a manner that allows us to know, respond, and care for a diverse range of livable and desirable lives. These are the conditions for starting to forge a justice that in its join with science resists any easy claim to the universal, and instead inquires after the specific practices and values that make it possible. A justice that embraces speculative commitment and a loyal attachment to situated visions. A justice that recognizes and responds to the feeling that some things just are not right, yet reminds us that the answers will never be final, that lives will always be lost, and that we will never know in advance what to do.
And perhaps embrace this justice we must. For whenever we are able to claim justice we have found an open, a fissure between the world as it is and the world as we want it to be. It is this opening that we must not cede. genome to be assembled by the public effort, spoke of the problem of human genetic fiefdoms, and the importance of the open access policy developed by the human genomics community. For a report on this meeting, see Reardon, Fullerton, and Purcell (2008) . 21. According to program directors of the National Human Genome Research Institute, the final sequence of the human genome was derived from ten people from Buffalo, New York. Ten were chosen from a much larger pool to ensure that the final sequence was ''anonymous''-that is, that the human identities remained private, or enclosed. 22. In particular, increasingly I hear researchers calling for an end to the increasingly intricate practices developed to keep samples ''anonymous.'' As one researcher at UCSC recently put it, ''I think the field has to forget about anonymity'' (Fieldnotes, March 4, 2011) . 23. Consider the rise of the Tea Party movement in the United States, and protests against states all over the Middle East. 24. A decade of ELSI research: a celebration of the first ten years of the ELSI programs: January [16] [17] [18] 2001 . http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11501561. 25. For a text of these hearings, see http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/011701ashcroft.htm (accessed March 13, 2011). 26. Here I use abject to refer to those who are alive, yet not alive-those who exist outside of the symbolic order and thus evoke feelings of repulsion. As Shteyngart explores in his recent novel Super Sad True Love Story, and Octavia Butler explores in her xenogenesis trilogy, genomic and informatic technologies play key roles in constituting the normal and the abject, and thus the lives that can be lived. The role technoscience plays in constituting life through its constitution of the abject is one that requires more attention. Because of a failure to interrogate its own historical, cultural, and political foundations, this attention is not generated by dominant constructions of genomics and justice. As I will argue at the end of this essay, we require formations of science and justice that return to these foundations. 27. See https://www.23andme.com/you/faqwin/ethnicchoices/ (accessed March 13, 2011). 28. I specify dominant here as alternative forms of genomics that do respond to the values and concerns of Native peoples are emerging. See, in particular, the work of Laura Arbour (Arbour and Cook 2006 
